Informed by emancipatory theory and praxis, the GSWSEP makes being for the Other (Bauman, 1993; Levinas, 1985; Sewpaul, 2015) the normative in social work. The potential asymmetrical nature of such relationships might bear the risk of minimizing and patronizing the Other in social work relationships. But the appeal for such an approach lies in the GSWSEP’s emphasis on inter-dependence, where one’s humanity is recognised in relationships with others, echoing the value of Ubuntu (Letseka, 2014) with the African maxim, “I am a person through other people”, or “I am because we are”, which is also reflected in other value systems across the world. Levinas (1985) and Bauman (1993) asserted that the moral self, accords the unique Other that priority assigned to the self. For Levinas, to be responsible means to make oneself available for service of the Other in such a way that one’s own life is intrinsically linked with that of others. This is reflected in the GSWSEP. The justification for the self begins with the Other; our responses to the call of the Other define ourselves. Thus, Bauman’s (1993) emphasis on meeting with the stranger – the Other as Face – not as persona, a mask worn to signify the role played.
The unconditional positive regard implied in the above inheres of spiritual beliefs of humankind, the dignity and infinite potential that every human being possesses, and the importance of differentiating between the person and her/his conduct, attitudes or circumstances that might be in need of change. Linked to this is Bergoffen’s argument (cited in Feder, 2014) that we must challenge “the traditional grounding of human rights in the principle of individual autonomy” to protect and privilege “the humanity of our embodied vulnerability” (p. 117). By virtue of being born into this world each one of is vulnerable. Of particular salience to social work is Bergoffen’s contention that dignity predicated on autonomy is a fantasy born of “a desire to escape the risks of being vulnerable”, and the importance of conceiving of human rights, not in a narrow sense of “inhering within individuals” but rights located “between” individuals (p. 179). In a similar way, Miller (2017) sees dignity foregrounded in relationality; the recognition that one’s humanity is only recognized in solidarity and inter-connectedness with the Other. No person is totally autonomous and independent; we are all interdependent. Intersectionality highlights various social criteria that render some persons/groups of persons more vulnerable than others, but we are all imbricated in socio-political and economic systems, socio-cultural conventions, and dominant societal discourses, thus rendering us all, even the most privileged of us, vulnerable to varying degrees.
Understanding the embodied vulnerability of humanity might: facilitate more empathetic tuning into the life worlds of people; minimize othering as ‘us’ versus ‘them’; counter the idea of the social worker as expert; contribute to more egalitarian relationships; and enable us to truly be for the Other. It is for these reasons, and the attempt to de-stigmatize social work services, that neither the 2014 Global Definition nor the GSWSEP uses the word “client”, but refers to people who we work or engage with. The GSWSEP acknowledges the complexities that our embodied vulnerabilities bring to the social work relationship, with Principle 1.3 reading as: “As social workers we (as do the people whom we engage with) bring to the working relationship our histories, pains and joys, values, and our religious, spiritual and cultural orientations. Critical reflection on how the personal influences the professional and vice versa must be the foundation of everyday ethical practice”. Thus, the need for the awakening of awareness and consciousness.
